Monday, September 7, 2009

The Australian Book Trade and Parallel Importation: a Compromise Proposal

There it was again on Sunday morning - the question to this government that simply won't go away: 'But what unpopular decisions have you taken so far? What painful policy proposals have you implemented?' Barrie Cassidy was interviewing Wayne Swan on The Insiders.

Swan listed a few semi-forgotten things but nothing really emblematic stood out. The parallel importation issue presents a perfect opportunity for the Rudd government to firmly, clearly and very symbolically demonstrate its reform credentials; to send an unmistakable message to the big end of town, the commentariat, the ordinary voter: 'I don't just write essays about the need to improve Australia's productivity performance, the need to continue the process of reform so successfully undertaken by the Hawke and Keating governments - I'm getting on with it'.

But let's get real. Even with the cover of the Productivity Commission's report, it is extremely unlikely that this government will seize the day. First and foremost in its mind will be the loud and continuing shrieks and howls of outrage from the cultural elite if it took this course. And from the printing unions. And from state governments. And the Fairfax press. Support from the usual suspects - the Fin Review, The Australian, Bob Carr - none of this would compensate. This is a government focussed on 'palatable' policy, not policy purity.

Therefore, seeing that we're now close to the end - Cabinet's decision is expected within weeks - and we're at the final hand-to-hand combat stage, it's probably time to frame some sort of compromise position that I believe all players, however reluctantly, would accept.

I sent this letter to Kevin Rudd on September 1:


Dear Mr Rudd

The Australian Book Trade and Parallel Importation: a Compromise Proposal

The media is reporting that Cabinet may be close to debating the recommendations of the Productivity Commission to abolish the Parallel Importation Restrictions (PIRs) in the Copyright Act that currently regulate book importation into Australia by retailers.

I have been an active participant in this debate for over 20 years in my capacity as Managing Director of John Wiley and Sons Australia Ltd, a board member of the Australian Publishers Association for ten years, a past President of that association, and now, having recently retired, through my industry blog Pub Date Critical (www.peterdonoughue.blogspot.com) and my recent appointment as Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Queensland.

I have always been in favor of reform and have been a lone voice on the publishing side of the ledger.

My sense now, however, is that the industry needs to come together around a compromise position. Such a position could be constructed by your government and I believe it would receive the support of the vast majority of authors, publishers and booksellers, and all their industry associations. It would likely also receive the support, albeit grudging, of those retailers like Dymocks who are strongly in favor of complete abolition.

My proposal would involve two elements:

1. Maintain the 30-day frontlist protection, but only for the first five years of a title's life.
2. Abolish the 90 day backlist provision altogether.

Providing local authors and publishers with protection from parallel importation for the first five years of the life of a particular title would, in virtually all cases, be more than sufficient to get a full return from the investment associated with local development, printing, marketing and selling. Very few publishing projects these days are costed with a view to a life beyond five years, although of course many continue to sell well for years beyond this period. No publisher would seriously consider not investing in a project or author on the basis that parallel importation protection would expire five years after first publication. And no author, established or otherwise, could seriously mount a case that the government had eroded his or her rights to local publication or income.

The current 90 day backlist protection is a legacy of sea freight time frames from the UK and the US and makes no sense these days when air freight is the norm. There have been calls from some industry players that the period should be shortened to 30 days or even 7 days. But allowing retailers the immediate freedom to import if the local publisher is out of stock is by far the best way to maintain competitive pressure on the privileged supplier. In the great majority of cases the retailer will wait for the publisher to re-stock because it is simply less expensive and more efficient to do so. Mostly the wait would be for only a week or two. Once the title is back in stock the local publisher would regain the protection initially afforded.

The virtue of this compromise position is that no industry party could credibly object. Those in favor of adopting the Productivity Commission's total abolition recommendations would obviously be less than happy, but they would at least be able to celebrate a significant movement their way. Close to 80% of English language titles in print would be available on the open market. The authors and publishers, on the other hand, would welcome such an outcome with a fair measure of enthusiasm. They would certainly perceive it as a victory for their lobbying efforts. The 50,000 or so protected titles on the market at any one time would constitute the bulk of industry revenue.

The other virtue of this position is that it does not involve any re-thinking of the current programs of government support for literature or publishing.

I trust you will find this proposal helpful.

Yours respectfully


Peter Donoughue

Tuesday, August 25, 2009

Melbourne Writers Festival: Panel on Parallel Importation

This MWF panel brought together Allan Fels (ex ACCC), Gabrielle Coyne (Penguin), Sandy Grant (Hardie Grant), David Vodicki (music industry) and me to discuss the issues under the chairmanship of Mark Davis from Melbourne Uni.

It was an enjoyable night, but predictably frustrating. There were about 50 people in the audience.

Here are some of the claims that were made and my responses to them. There simply wasn't time on the night to go into any depth, so I'll do that now.

1. It might be true that, technically, territorial copyright (TC) wouldn't be affected by the abolition of the parallel importation restrictions (PIRs), but the reality of it would be thoroughly subverted.

Henry Rosenbloom made this point and claimed that my separation of TC and the PIRs is a 'distinction without a difference'. Well this simply doesn't hold water. It's a neat side-stepping of the issue. For TC to be subverted booksellers would have to source a significant percentage, if not all, of their foreign-originated books from overseas wholesalers rather than from local publishers. It implies a number of things: a) that local publishers would not be able to profitably compete with overseas sources of supply; b) that, even if they could, booksellers wouldn't order from them.

Both these contentions are rubbish. Both Dymocks and Kinokuniya (the only two booksellers arguing for an open market) have repeatedly said local sources of supply are by far their preferred option, all other things being equal. It is far less expensive, far more efficient and makes inventory management far easier. But publishers must come to the party and make their offering competitive. The days of sitting back and hiding behind antiquated regulations are long gone. What is wrong with asking publishers to be competitive? Everybody benefits if they are.

2. The Productivity Commission's (PC) pricing analysis, which shows Australian prices at current exchange rates to be 30% higher than US prices of similar editions, and 50% higher than the cheapest US editions, is deeply flawed for two reasons: if the average exchange rate over the last 10 years of 0.69c is taken into account the price differential evaporates; and no account has been taken of the freight costs to ship books from the US to Australia.

As I've said before in this blog the PC's pricing analysis is one of the best things in their report. Publishers ought to do themselves and the whole debate a favor and accept it. They should also stop hiding behind the absurd ten-year average exchange rate argument. The average over the last five years is 0.79c. Today it is 0.83c. The facts here are simply incontestable. As for the freight argument this has no substance. Airfreight to Australia from the US costs about 5% - 10% of the average retail price, depending on the volume of the shipment and it's weight. Furthermore, and this is a key point, airfreight costs are part and parcel of overall trading terms negotiations with overseas principals. The higher the freight the deeper the purchasing discount, which is why Australian publishers normally get sweeter discounts from their US suppliers than their colleagues in either Canada or Britain. The same goes for shipments from the UK.

The fact that local publishers get this decided advantage from their overseas principals is precisely why retail booksellers, who will get a far worse deal on freight from the overseas wholesalers, would prefer to buy locally. Why would a bookseller pay for the freight when the publisher can much more easily absorb it, and therefore price competitively?

3. Publishers will find it hard to sell export rights to Australian titles because the buying publisher will demand a non-exclusive right to re-export their edition back to Australia, given the new open-market status of this territory.


This is an exquisite piece of illogicality! The Australian publisher obviously holds exclusive Australian rights under the contract with the author, so it's logically impossible to sign any non-exclusive deal with anyone else. As well, the only way the UK or US edition can come back to Australia is via a UK or US based wholesaler. In that case no contract is necessary.

But the root of this confusion lies in the term 'open market', which British and American publishers universally think of as a market for competing editions, all operating on a non-exclusive basis. Australia won't be like this, as I've explained in my last post. It would be more accurate to describe Australia, if the PIRs are abolished, as a 'deregulated market' where booksellers can parallel import in the hard cases.

It will be up to Australian publishers to explain these realities properly, and positively, to overseas publishers. Dopey notions need to be solidly and politely whacked.


4. Virtually the whole industry considers the PC report poison, therefore it must be!


I refuse to give this comment any credibility by spending time refuting it! We are really at the bottom of the barrel here.


5. Economic rationalism has no place in the world of books and culture. The PC report should be ignored by any government seriously interested in preserving and developing Australian writing, literature and identity. Slightly lower prices are absolutely no substitute.


Where do you start with this one? If the whiff of elitism doesn't turn you off then the cultural bunker mentality should. How dare any mere economist encroach on our pristine, privileged terrain? This stuff is straight out of the 80's. Surely we've got beyond it. By all means attack the economists' arguments, assumptions, methodologies and recommendations, but don't embarrass everybody by claiming they have no right. Ugh!


Thursday, July 23, 2009

Exclusive Australian Rights in an Open Market

I know some publishers fear that it will not be possible to buy exclusive Australian rights to overseas titles under Australia's version of an 'open market'.

Therefore, abolition of the PIRs would in fact mean that territorial copyright would no longer exist in Australia. Territorial copyright relies on exclusivity.

A version of this way of thinking crops up all the time in the way some commentators refer to the abolition of the PIRs as meaning that Australia 'will become a market for competing editions'. This is the favorite way Jason Steger, literary editor of The Age, for example, expresses the meaning of the reforms.

They are all very wrong.

Firstly, Australia is a natural territory, just like the US, Britain and Canada. Trading exclusive rights is possible because of geographic, population and market dynamic features that naturally secure and enforce those rights. This means that Australia will not be an 'open territory' in the way that Hong Kong, Singapore, Continental Europe, the Middle East and Africa are.

Secondly, once exclusive Australian rights have been secured, NO OTHER PUBLISHER'S EDITION CAN COME HERE, other than by direct importation by a bookseller from an overseas wholesaler. That's the way things are now, and they won't change.

Australia will not be a market, therefore, 'for competing editions', meaning a market where US and UK publishers fight it out.

Some Australian publishers believe US and UK publishers/agents will only want to sell them non-exclusive rights.

This may initially be the case, but it certainly won't last. Six weeks max. Faced with insistent demand from British and Australian publishers wanting to pay good money for exclusive Australian rights, it will quickly dissipate. Willing buyers breed sellers.

Nonsense from Michael and Henry

Michael Heyward and Henry Rosenbloom are two of Australia's best publishers. They run Text and Scribe respectively, small but highly successful and critically important Melbourne-based independent publishing companies.

They are also excellent writers, with a gift for the nicely honed phrase. They've been given an inordinate amount of space in the nation's press, particularly The Age, during the current parallel importation debate.

It's a pity therefore that their opinions and arguments are so baseless and wrong-headed. In fact, they're nonsense - all emotion and no intellect.

If you want to read their latest outpourings here they are:

http://www.scribepublications.com.au/blog?source
www.theage.com.au/opinion/our-writers-and-publishers-dont-need-handouts-20090722-dtif.html

The fundamental mistake they make is in considering that the argument is all about territorial copyright, when it isn't.

Here's Henry: 'With its recommendation that territorial copyright for books be abandoned, the Productivity Commission....' (my italics).

Here's Michael: 'As the gospellers of deregulation, the commissioners have stuck to their hymn sheet: remove all import restrictions, strike down territorial copyright' (my italics).

Nowhere in the PC's recommendations is there any mention whatsoever of 'territorial copyright'! The recommendation is to remove the Parallel Importation Restrictions (PIRs).

Michael and Henry consider that by removing the PIR's you remove the ability of authors and publishers to benefit, as they do now, from territorial copyright. This is manifestly untrue, and to proclaim otherwise demonstrates a massive failure of thought and logic, and a dismal ignorance as to how the industry actually works.

One can forgive the nation's authors for getting this thing so wrong. They're not involved daily in the dynamics of the trade, and during this debate have mostly been fed lines by their publishers anyway. But I find it astonishing and profoundly disappointing that practicing publishers could prove to be so confused in their understanding and appreciation of some of the basic issues.

Here's the fundamental illogicality: (I'm paraphrasing the publishers' position)

Premise 1. 'What with freight costs, exchange volatility, no return rights etc, the opportunities for consistently profitable direct importing by booksellers are just not there'.

Premise 2: 'Without the PIRs therefore, prices to consumers will only occasionally be lower than what they are today. The Commission is massively overstating what beneficial impacts there will be from their recommendations'.

Therefore: 'The publishing industry would be devastated'.

As you see, this syllogism makes no sense whatsoever. The PC picked up on this pretty easily, as have most commentators from outside the industry over the last twenty years. But still the publishers don't get it!

It's simply embarrassing!

The facts are that there will be plenty of opportunities for direct importation by booksellers, but only where local rights-holding publishers have chosen to over-price and under-service. Once they stop doing that they'll close off the business logic of buying around them and will secure their place as the preferred supplier. They will supply close to 100% of the demand.

Do you see where this has anything to do with territorial rights? Only at the margins, and only where an arrogant publisher chooses to be vulnerable.

Do you see a devastation of the industry here? Do you see an almighty whack to Australian literary culture? Oh, please!

Here's where the consumer will benefit. Lower prices will mainly come about through the existence of lower-priced editions overseas, particularly the premium or literary paperback, selling in the US for around $US16.00. Australian rights-holders will have to be responsive to this, by issuing equivalent editions here, priced at around $A23.95. Sticking with the $A32.95 bigger 'C format' paperback as the title sinks into the backlist will pretty much become dated. But, interestingly, this change is happening now. There are more and more of the quality $22-24 smaller, but well produced, paperback editions coming from Australian publishers every day, and it's a very welcome trend.

Buying and selling exclusive Australian rights, and negotiating to exclusively represent overseas lists on an agency basis will remain as strong a feature of the Australian publishing landscape as it's ever been.

Any 'devastation' scenarios should be consigned to the fantasy section!

Friday, July 17, 2009

Fiction and Fact on Book Prices

FICTION: 'There is no evidence that prices will come down if the PIRs are removed. The Productivity Commission is typically indulging in discredited free trade theory and tired ideology'.

FACT: Beside the bleeding obvious fact that the new regime hasn't been implemented in Australia so how could there be any evidence, the commission clearly states, on numerous occasions throughout the report, that removal of the provisions will remove the 'upwards pressure on prices'. They don't guarantee or promise or even say that prices will come down. The expectation clearly is that they will, if only as a matter of logic. To use an analogy, if a pool is drained presumably there'll be less drownings in it. Someone could still stick their head in the remaining dregs and do the job, but as a matter of plain common sense I would go out on a limb and say there'll very probably be less death by drowning in the non-water circumstance.

FICTION: 'If you compare Australian prices of imported US titles with their US prices you will see that local prices are not higher at all once the average exchange rate of $0.69 is taken into account'.

FACT: If you conveniently chose an average exchange rate that suits your purpose, well, unsurprisingly, this is true. The APA has selected the past ten years as its time frame. This works only because of the collapse of the A$ in the five year period from 1999 to 2003 inclusive, when, according to RBA charts, the average rate was $0.57. Over the five years since then (2004 to 2008 inclusive) the rate has been $0.79, pretty close to where it is today. Do you see any publishers pricing their imports according to that rate? No. They've had five years to adjust but have chosen not to. The 'ten year average' mightily suits their case.

FICTION: 'Dymocks and the Coalition for Cheaper Books are not really interested in lower prices to consumers but higher profits for themselves'.

FACT: I'll go out on a limb and suggest that Dymocks and the Coalition are probably interested in both. If they can source books at lower prices off shore then that gives them more margin and enables them to be more competitive by passing on some of that margin to consumers. It's called business. It happens right across the economy. It's not original or innovative and it's not rocket science. Now, with the PIRs in place, any price discounting they do to attract customers has to come 100% out of their own margin. They're discounting widely now, so why wouldn't they be motivated to do more of it if they can secure lower purchasing costs? Once again, it's a matter of logic. (The other way to gain more margin is to do what A&R/Borders is doing and mark up everything above recommended retail price. What sort of customer friendly strategy is that? Yet Dymocks, who've never marked up, is copping the flak!)


Wednesday, July 15, 2009

The Productivity Commission's final report.


In the Commission’s view, while removal of the PIRs should see an increase in imported books where these represent better value, it is probable that most Australian publishers, including the major publishing houses, would generally adapt to the new regime, that Australian stories and content will continue to be demanded and that talented and marketable Australian authors would continue to be widely published. Any pressure for contraction would also be ameliorated to the extent that subsidy arrangements were made more effective. (Report, p XX111)

In its long, frequently repetitive, constantly frustrating, badly structured and often poorly written final report released yesterday the Productivity Commission has finally seen the light, reverted to its true free market economic self, and made some core recommendations that make absolute sense, both for the industry and the nation.

The recommendation to totally abolish the import restrictions rather than tinker with them is very welcome. The recommendation to delay the implementation of this reform for three years is disappointing. One year, or even two, would have been sensible.

The recommendation to review and increase direct subsidies for worthy books is utterly unnecessary.

Why is the report constantly frustrating? It continually overstates the 'harm' and 'contraction' that removing the PIRs would bring to the industry, yet makes no attempt to describe, much less measure, this effect. I have always contended that removing the PIRs would be a fairly innocuous thing to do, like 'removing the dingo fence from around suburbia'. Sure, publishers would have to adjust, but publishers are having to adjust to unfolding, significant events all the time - violent currency movements, mergers and acquisitions of themselves and their customers, subverting technologies, and so forth. Adjusting pricing, trading terms and supply practices to compete in a PIR-free market is hardly the stuff of nightmares. Coping with the Red Retail Group (A&R/Borders) is a rather more significant challenge I would have thought. Or coping with the pressure for huge and unwarranted author advances.

Although the commission acknowledges that 'the extent of the pending contraction has often been overstated by those in sectors facing reform', it cedes far too much ground to its opponents by substantially agreeing with them that there'll be a measure of contraction.

The overwhelming and quite possibly, at least in a political sense, fatal weakness of the report is its adamant refusal to confront the confusion and wrong-headedness of most of the submissions sent to it by authors and publishers. The universal claim that this issue is all about territorial copyright and, in Tim Winton's words, the 'brutal assault' on it by reform proponents, has been allowed to go utterly unchallenged. The commission has an annoying habit of assaying opinions and quoting all sorts of views contained in the submissions, but leaves them on the page like stinking turds, uncommented upon and unswept away. It unfortunately hasn't seemed to have grasped that there is a qualitative difference between the PIRs and the reality of territorial copyright, and that abolishing the PIRs in no way renders inoperative the ability of authors to sell and publishers to acquire Australian rights. Prognostications of doom contained in these submissions are therefore quite absurd. By leaving them uncontested the commission has allowed them to still live and breathe and retain their great emotional and political power. This is a huge mistake. Even in the commentary last night and today from journalists and industry players this 'assault on our rights' notion is still being trotted out.

The commission certainly didn't take this live-and-let-live approach to challenges to its pricing comparison methodologies from some parties after its draft report was released. In this final report it has really hopped into them in no uncertain terms. The pricing analysis is one of the best things in the report, and you can sense how jealous the commission is to protect its integrity.

It's clear the commission hasn't really grasped the critical importance of territorial copyright to the whole structure and dynamic of the global publishing industry. It's a foundational concept. There are passing references to the practice of 'price discrimination' in different territories but it's vaguely frowned upon, as supporting 'the segmentation of world book markets'. Hence acknowledging it as a value seems beyond the commission's powers.

Had it believed in it, it would have aimed both barrels at accusations it was out to destroy it, and blown the confusions, misrepresentations and dismal ignorance right away. It has committed a fatal mistake, and left its flanks utterly vulnerable in the highly charged political campaign to come.

There are some real nuggets in this report, but many of them will go unnoticed, unread and unappreciated. They are buried in prose as deadening as a Kevin Rudd speech, and in a wandering narrative structure crying out for sharpness and focus.

Nevertheless, here are some of them:

The contention underpinning much commentary (both prior to and following the discussion draft) — that reform to the PIRs would have little or no impact on book prices and yet would cause a significant contraction in local publishing — is not, in the Commission’s view, sustainable. Among other things, as pointed out in chapter 4, if cheaper, or otherwise better value, books were not available for importation from overseas, removal of the PIRs would have little substantive impact on the industry. (p 1.7)

While the power relationship between local publishers and booksellers would change somewhat were the PIRs removed, the value of local supply relationships to booksellers could add to the natural protection of distance from foreign markets to provide a price margin for local publishers facing prospective competition from foreign editions. (p 5.8)

As such, were PIRs removed, the greatest impact on booksellers might not come from the actual degree to which they shift away from domestic publishers, but rather from their ability to make a choice to shift to overseas suppliers if they were unsatisfied with local sources. The availability of such options would increase the pressure upon publishers to offer competitive prices and conditions, providing the spur for greater efficiencies in domestic publishing and distribution. In this context, the current PIR regime increases the scope for publishers with market power to engage in practices that, while maximising their own returns, in some cases may be detrimental to booksellers, and indeed consumers. (p 5.21)

Thursday, July 2, 2009

Which way has the Commission jumped?

The Productivity Commission has now delivered its final report to the government, and apparently it will be released to the public the week beginning July 13.

It will be utterly fascinating to see which way the Commission has chosen to go.

Here's the way I see it:

- The draft report's 'protection for the first 12 months' is dead in the water. It proved to be utterly friendless. The commission will have ditched it.

- However, because the commission, unwisely in my view, chose to develop a messy, interventionist, halfway house position, it's highly likely that the 'initial period of protection' notion will have been retained. The time-frame will have been extended to five years. It could be three, but, politically, five ticks more boxes. No one in the industry could credibly object. Even the APA would down weapons (did I say that?...)

- Think about it: the industry could not possibly fight this without completely sacrificing all credibility. And the politicians would not chose to be more catholic than the pope. They would accept the PC's recommendations. That would give the commission a much needed political win.

- Those of us who, unlike St Augustine, consider that now is the time to be pure, will also have to lay down arms and accept the compromise. Maybe we'll be handed a bone: a recommendation that in five years the situation be revisited to assess how the new regime is working. And the PC might say that, if local publishers are at that time still obviously the source of more than 90% of the older backlist (as will surely be the case), then maybe they'd more easily accept full deregulation from day one. They would have realised their fears were misplaced (did I say that?..).

- Of course, as is infrequently the case, I could be wrong. The commission could have chosen the non-Augustinian, economically pure and rational position, and recommended the PIRs be completely abolished, and they might even have confronted the wrong-headedness of the industry submissions head on. The brutally negative responses to the draft report's 12 month recommendation might have shocked them, sent them back to economic taws and emboldened them to be more true to themselves.

Somehow I doubt it.



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